From a profit of 750 million yuan to a net loss of 2 billion yuan, it actually used only one quarter?! In mid-July, Sellis released a performance trailer saying that it is expected that the net profit attributable to shareholders of listed companies in the first half of 2026 will be converted from profit to loss, and the net loss will be between 1.5 billion yuan and 1.8 billion yuan. Looking at the two sets of data, it may be easy to feel what such a loss means. Group 1: In the first quarter of this year, Selis was also able to harvest a net profit of 754 million yuan. This means that their losses in the second quarter of 2026 are between 2.25 billion and 2.55 billion yuan. Group 2: In the first half of 2026, the cumulative sales volume of Xilis increased by 3.87% year-on-year, and the sales volume of Qianjie brand increased by 5.60%. In other words, more cars were sold than in the same period in 2025, and as a result, profits changed from positive 2.9 billion yuan to negative more than 1.5 billion yuan, with a gap of 4.5 billion yuan inside and outside. Seeing such a big performance change in a short period of time, market sentiment is more likely to blame Huawei, because they have to pay Huawei a large amount of purchasing and sales expenses every year. In recent years, not only automobile companies, but the entire automobile industry has undergone painful structural reshaping, and the difficulty of profitability has become more and more serious. Today's Xerxes may be tomorrow's "you and I". The profit and loss should not be blamed on Huawei Xilis in the performance announcement, attributing the loss to the "upstream supplier price increase" and "book value adjustment". "Upstream price increase" mainly refers to the increase in the price of main raw materials such as memory chips, industrial metals, lithium carbonate and other factors, resulting in increased costs. The book value adjustment is due to the significant depreciation of some assets due to technical iteration, model replacement and other factors, resulting in more book losses. Obviously, what Selis means is that the upstream asking price is too high, which pushes up the cost at the same time, and the industry is too voluminous, which leads to the company having to reduce the price of sales. Simply put, it is not that he does not work hard, but that he blames the upstream for being too ruthless and the industry for being too voluminous. Many people habitually blame Huawei for Cyrus' losses. The financial report shows that in 2025, Celis paid 22.34 billion yuan for procurement, labor and other expenses to Shenzhen Yingwang Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. (80% owned by Huawei), accounting for about 13.5% of the company's annual revenue. In addition, a considerable part of their annual sales expenses of 24.2 billion yuan was also paid to Huawei. In 2025, the main sales volume of Sellis was the boundary M8/M9 with an average price of more than 400,000 yuan. By 2026, the M9 was in an unstable position, the M8 was a "knee-cut" in sales, and the main-selling model became an M6 with an average price of more than 20,000 yuan. The gross profit margin of the latter and the former are not a level at all. In addition, Huawei is also involved in the decision making of the replacement rhythm of products such as the boundary M9 and the adjustment of hardware configuration. Even so, the slumping performance of Xilis could not be thrown at Huawei. After all, Huawei's technology, marketing and other advantages are one of the core competencies of the boundary. With impressive net profits in 2024 and 2025, Huawei excels. The loss of Xerix is more like a microcosm of the common phenomenon in the industry. Losses, not only the upstream price increase, or the market volume, or even the huge cost of intelligent electrification technology, are not the only problems of Xilis, but a common phenomenon in the industry. The car companies that have deep cooperation with Huawei are not the Xilis family. More and more car companies are adopting Huawei's smart driving solutions. Celeste has also made significant profits, and some car companies have not even seen positive net profits so far. Especially in the case of a sharp decline in China's auto market in the first half of 2026, the average profit margin of domestic vehicle manufacturing is 1.5%, the lowest level in nearly a decade, which is far lower than the average profit level of 6.1% of industrial enterprises above the national scale. Since mid-July, many Chinese auto companies have issued performance forecasts for the first half of 2026, and the data is not only ugly. GAC Group expects the attributable net loss to be 4.06 billion yuan to 4.57 billion yuan in the first half of the year, with the loss expanding by about 60% to 80% year-on-year, which is also a result of rising sales. BAIC Blue Valley is expected to have a net loss of 1.77 billion yuan to 1.97 billion yuan, which has been a loss for six and a half consecutive years. JAC expects a net loss of approximately RMB740 million. In addition, although Great Wall Automobile and Changan Automobile are profitable, they also have waist-cutting profits. Great Wall Motor's net profit is expected to decline by about 59% to 63% year-on-year, Changan Automobile's net profit is expected to decline by 57% to 67% year-on-year, and the deduction of non-net profit is as high as 77% to 84%. The living environment of China's automobile manufacturing industry is becoming increasingly difficult. The industry's "talkers" have changed. If someone says that the Chinese automobile industry is not working, I can find a bunch of evidence to refute it. Also in the first half of 2026, China's automobile exports exceeded 5 million units, an increase of 65.3% year-on-year, and in June, it achieved a monthly export of 1 million units. Developed markets such as Europe and Australia have become the top five destinations for Chinese car exports. At the same time, more and more multinational automobile giants have begun to learn from China's automobile industry, investing in Chinese automobile companies such as Xiaopeng and Zero Run, and cooperating with Chinese suppliers such as Huawei and Ningde Times. Obviously, China's automotive industry is at the forefront of the world in terms of smart electrification. Obviously, Chinese cars are very good! However, the structure of China's automotive industry is adjusting. In 2025, Huawei's smart car business revenue surged by more than 70% to 45 billion yuan. In the same period, CATL's net profit exceeded the total net profit of China's A-share listed car companies. Momenta, which just went public, also achieved a service fee revenue ratio of more than 40%, driving the gross profit margin to soar to 71.6%. As the price of memory chips has risen due to the shortage of supply and demand, Changxin Technology, which opened its subscription on the Science and Technology Innovation Board on July 16, is expected to have a net profit of more than 50 billion yuan in the first half of 2026. Smart cars are also one of their main sources of income. The discourse power of China's automobile industry is no longer in the hands of automobile manufacturers, but is gradually shifting to the hands of intelligent electrification enterprises. Of course, truly grasping the right to speak is also one of the leading companies in the field of intelligent electrification, and the total number of enterprises is still very few. Conclusion Another round of elimination of the Chinese automobile industry has begun. It is no longer the automobile manufacturing industry that has stood in the center of the stage for the past hundred years just firing the firing gun. Looking at the smart electrification industry giants with growing discourse power, automakers are facing difficult choices such as handing over profits, self-development of technology, or in situ. Handing over profits may increase your own losses; self-development of technology may also make it difficult to catch up with your opponents. Neither option is easy. Do you think automakers can regain their say in the marketplace? Welcome to the comments section!.